Neutrality and Foreign Military Sales: Military Production and Sales Restrictions in Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland by Bjorn Hagelin

Author:Bjorn Hagelin [Hagelin, Bjorn]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Political Science, General
ISBN: 9780367014797
Google: GXekDwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 50737300
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2019-06-17T00:00:00+00:00

The explicit political decision in Switzerland of a loose implementation of formal policy explains why recipients can be found in the Middle East and southern Africa despite control requirements excluding zones of conflict. Recipients such as Dubai, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia more than counterbalance the loss of Iran as a major Middle Eastern recipient in 1978 (see also Appendix C).

For Sweden, the picture is different. The statistics reflect a tendency to stay away from the main zones of conflict, such as Central America, the Middle East and southern Africa. Apart from Iran, which was a Swedish recipient until 1981, no country in the Middle East has officially and directly received Swedish war materiel.

In summary, the Western export orientation has been further emphasized by the preceding analysis. Finland’s customers in Eastern Europe are of little economic importance. Despite an increasing relative importance, the Third World does not account for more than 50 per cent of sales from any of the neutrals.

Finland and Switzerland show no inclination to embargo direct sales to zones of military conflict. Instead, it seems as if they are taking advantage of zones of conflict in their attempts to sell military supplies. Military sales from Switzerland to the Middle East and southern Africa are becoming proportionately more important over time.

For all of the neutrals, the major recipients account for more than 50 per cent of total military sales. Although the number of major recipients is low (between five and nine), they support the pattern that we have already seen: Sweden, the major neutral military producer, has the highest number of major recipients, followed by Switzerland and Finland, respectively.

Again we make a surprising finding with regard to Finland’s military sales. The U.S. market has generally been difficult to enter due to U.S. protective measures. It is therefore surprising to note that North America (the United States and Canada) has accounted for more than 10 per cent of total Finnish war materiel sales. During the early 1970s, the share was more than 25 per cent and is today close to 20 per cent. Most of this share is accounted for by the United States.

Why is this? Two reasons may be suggested. First, Finnish foreign military sales are mainly composed of powder, ammunition and light arms for which there is a rather large global market. This may also explain the increase in foreign recipients since 1976. The Buy American Act is probably not as strictly applied to these types of supplies as to supplies that compete with important U.S. materiel.

But if this is true for sales from Finland, why is it not also true of sales from the other neutrals given that they all produce these kinds of supplies? A second possible reason could therefore be, as with the training of Finnish officers in the United States (Hagelin 1986), that U.S. purchases of war materiel from Finland are a way of supporting Finland’s military production and defense without the United States being clearly visible. Should U.S. support take other, more visible forms, it might create difficulties for Finland’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

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